Reputational risk, academic freedom and research ethics review by Hedgecoe, Adam
Sociology
 1 –16
© The Author(s) 2015




Reputational Risk, Academic 





Drawing on scholarship around academic freedom and new public management, this article 
explores the way in which research ethics committees in UK universities (URECs) can come to 
exhibit behaviour – common in their US equivalents – that prioritises the reputational protection 
of their host institution over and above academic freedom and the protection of research subjects. 
Drawing on two case studies the article shows both how URECs can serve to restrict research 
that may be ‘embarrassing’ for a university and how, in high profile cases, university management 
come to use such committees as mechanisms for internal discipline.
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It is a truth commonly acknowledged by sociologists that prior ethics review of research 
– originating as it does in the biomedical sciences – is unsuited for the oversight of social 
science (particularly qualitative social science), harming and impeding research espe-
cially that conducted on sensitive topics and populations. In the UK, while sociological 
concerns have tended to focus on the research ethics committee (REC) system overseeing 
research in the National Health Service (NHS) (e.g. Boden et al., 2009; McDonach et al., 
2009; Stalker et al., 2004) complaints have also been levelled against the more recent 
system of University RECs (URECs) (Hammersley, 2009; Holmwood, 2010; Stanley and 
Wise, 2010). While the growth of URECs can be traced to the 2006 publication of the 
Economic and Social Research Council’s Research Ethics Framework document (ESRC, 
2006), this expansion of ethics review to social science was in tune with broader trends; a 
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review carried out prior to the ESRC Framework suggested that over 80 per cent of UK 
universities surveyed had some form of ethics committee in place, with a quarter of such 
committees being set up before 1990 (Tinker and Coomber, 2004).
A key concern on the part of opponents of such review is that it infringes academic 
freedom by restricting the ability of sociologists and other social scientists to research 
the topics they deem important. For example, Martin Hammersley argues that, given that 
the principle of autonomy ‘must surely apply to researchers as well as to the people they 
study’ (2006: 7) the application of ethics review to the social sciences ‘amounts not only 
to a bureaucratization of research but also to unwarranted restriction on the freedom of 
researchers’ (2009: 218; see also Dingwall, 2008). In making these claims, UK-based 
critics have much in common with colleagues in the USA, where prior ethics review has 
been presented as an infringement of the first amendment and a clear threat to academic 
freedom (Hamburger, 2005; Katz, 2007).
However, the relationship between REC review and academic freedom is, at best, 
unclear. As Eric Barendt (2010: 210) points out, in the UK at least, academic freedom 
‘has never been understood to confer positive rights to funding for research or to conduct 
interviews with, say, health service staff and patients’. Yet opponents of such review 
might argue that only a minor proportion of social scientific research in the UK is either 
funded by the ESRC or set in the NHS. Why then should this remaining work be submit-
ted to prior ethical review?
One explanation for the development of URECs and the expansion of ethics review to 
all social science research (regardless of funder and setting) focuses on the broader con-
text of changes within UK higher education (Hammersley, 2010). This position argues 
that a key feature of UK universities over the past two decades has been the expansion 
into higher education of specific ways of organising public sector work, known as ‘new 
public management’ or NPM. This is a complex ‘set of assumptions and value statements 
about how public sector organizations should be designed, organized, managed … 
[where] … the basic idea … is to make [them] … much more “business-like” and “mar-
ket-oriented”’ (Diefenbach, 2009: 893).
While empirical research underlines how, in a higher education context at least, NPM 
is more complex than critics often suggest (Deem and Brehony, 2005), there are a gener-
ally agreed set of changes to management practice – such as clearer line-management, 
hierarchical work relations, increasing varieties of audit and league tables and a drive 
towards externally funded research – that mark out those universities that have under-
gone NPM (Deem et al., 2007; Kolsaker, 2008; Shore, 2008).
However, the impact of NPM on traditional forms of academic freedom – the freedom 
to ‘follow a line of research where it leads … [and the] … freedom to teach the truth as 
we see it’ (Russell, 1993: 18) – is unclear. Exercises such as the UK’s Research Excellence 
Framework may put pressure on academics to publish but aside from quality, the content 
of those publications remains outside the remit of audit. Even those authors most critical 
of the impact of NPM on higher education have difficulty producing empirical evidence 
of infringement of academic freedom, relying instead on hypotheticals (Craig et al., 
2014). Through the exploration of two case studies this article examines the role of 
URECs and their potential impact on academic freedom within the context of post-NPM 
higher education.
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For the purposes of this article, a key development in the evolution of NPM is the adop-
tion of risk management practices from the private sector (Lapsley, 2009). While its origin 
lies in high profile corporate scandals resulting from financial mismanagement – for exam-
ple, Barings, Enron, WorldCom – Michael Power (2004a: 61) suggests that the growth of 
risk management as an organisational practice has begun to take a specific form, essentially, 
that ‘most business people, when asked about the risk which worries them most, will often 
mention reputation’. The ‘multiplier effect’, whereby apparently minor indiscretions can be 
seen to indicate larger problems in organisational culture and have large scale repercussions 
means that ‘reputation risk reflects a new sense of vulnerability … for senior managers … 
and has created new demands to make reputation “manageable”’ (Power, 2004a: 61; see also 
Power, 2004b). Carried across from the private sector, the development of new public man-
agement means that ‘[i]n the public sector, risk management is a “reputation management 
strategy”’ (Lapsley, 2009: 16). While the practice of reputation management lacks a widely 
accepted definition, tending to be seen in terms of public relations or corporate communica-
tions (Hutton et al., 2001), it also involves control of internal organisational behaviour as a 
precursor to managing external reputations (Doorley and Garcia, 2010: 14–16). With the 
increasing importance of various league tables in higher education, reputation management 
has, over the past decade or so, become increasingly important to universities (British 
Council, 2014). Thus the focus of this article is how RECs come to serve as mechanisms for 
institutional reputation management, and in the process restrict academic freedom.
This article contributes to two specific literatures. The first is the body of work carrying 
out empirical research on ethics review which has tended to draw on ethnographic field-
work and has largely focused on the review of biomedical research in both the UK (Dyer, 
2004; Hedgecoe, 2012) and other countries (Fitzgerald, 2005; Stark, 2011, 2013). There 
has also been more limited work focusing on the review of social science (Hedgecoe, 2008) 
and it is to this latter literature that the current article makes a contribution.
The second contribution is to the small, but growing, literature (e.g. Fowler et al., 
2013; Murray, 2013) that takes as its data the results of Freedom of Information (FOI) 
Act requests (and other typically hidden documents such as accounts of disciplinary 
hearings), noting that such approaches offer ‘a unique means of studying official infor-
mation management and public relations activities’ (Walby and Larsen, 2011: 32). The 
resulting data resemble in many ways Gary Marx’s ‘dirty data’, ‘information which is 
kept secret and whose revelation would be discrediting or costly in terms of various types 
of sanctioning … [running] contrary to widely shared standards and images of what a 
person or group should be’ (Marx, 1984: 78).
The two case studies outlined in this article were chosen opportunistically; they are 
examples where problems around UREC review became public and where FOI data 
became available, allowing the opening of these particular regulatory ‘black boxes’. It 
should not be inferred therefore that the two universities involved are unique in having 
particular problems around ethics review and the role of management, but rather they are 
the two most obvious and researchable examples to date.
URECs, Sex and Institutional Reputation Management1
For almost 20 years, newspapers have reported that UK university students have turned 
to sex work because of reduction in student grants, increases in fees and resulting rising 
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levels of student debt (Duncan, 1997; Herbert, 2006; Telford, 2005), with similar claims 
being made about students in other countries (e.g. Duval Smith, 2006). Yet at the same 
time there has been growing resistance on the part of universities in the UK to academic 
research on the topic of student sex work, to the extent that one researcher in this area 
claims that:
There is now a growing consensus amongst the community of academics [researching this 
topic] that our universities are not conducive places for conducting research with students who 
wish to cash in some of their ‘sexual capital’ … it is evidence that research on this topic is not 
simply unwelcome, it is actively discouraged. (Roberts, 2010: 13)
Using emails, letters and minutes gathered through a Freedom of Information (FOI) 
request, this section explores the role of URECs in ‘discouraging’ this kind of research, 
focusing on the 2004/2005 decision by the Kingston University Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences REC regarding a proposed undergraduate research project. The proposed project 
looked at some of the factors influencing female students’ decision to enter the sex indus-
try. Because of the sensitive nature of this research topic, this project was referred to the 
faculty REC by the student’s supervisor, rather than being dealt with by the student project 
module teaching team. To allow speedy review of the application, it was discussed via 
email by a subcommittee of the REC before a decision was taken at a meeting.
REC members’ focus was primarily on the potential risks faced by the student 
researcher: ‘All I think we need to ascertain or build into the project is that the student 
carrying out the work is safe’ (Anon, 2004a). Another member ‘agree[s] with [name 
redacted] that the main issue is the safety of the student conducting the experiment. As it 
is [it is] not clear where the interviews/data collection will take place, except that it will 
be all over London and vary from person to person’ (Anon, 2004b). The proposed solu-
tion to the issue of researcher safety was ‘that the interviews should take place in an 
(public?) environment that will be safe for both the student and interviewee’ and that in 
addition ‘[t]he identity of the interviewee must be kept anonymous at all times in the 
course of the study’ (Anon, 2004c). This last member is relaxed enough about this pro-
posed research to note that:
Normally the ethics committee we [sic] would expect to see the consent form and interview 
schedule to check out how the project is represented to participants and the appropriateness of 
questions to be asked. I’m happy to leave the final judgement here to the supervisor if the rest 
of the committee are [too,] in the interests of speed … In principle then, I’m happy for the 
research to go ahead, but would like reassurance on the above points before the project is finally 
approved. (Anon, 2004c, emphasis added)
Thus at this stage of the process, the REC has given the impression that this project is 
largely unproblematic with the main ethical focus being the safety of the researcher. 
Solutions to this have been proposed, and one member has even made clear their willing-
ness not to review the consent form, in order to allow the research to proceed in a timely 
manner. The committee meeting itself took place on the same day as the last supportive 
email (20 October) and the student’s supervisor was sent a letter noting that: ‘After some 
discussion and assurances that no harm can come to the interviewer and that potential 
harm to the interviewees is minimized, this project was cleared’ (Anon, 2004d).
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However, soon after getting this approval, the supervisor ‘asked for the full commit-
tee to re-examine the project as he was not satisfied that the conditions were warranted’ 
(Anon, 2011) – what ‘conditions’ are not clear but perhaps around the need to conduct 
interviews in a public place – and asked for a full review by the whole of the REC. The 
resulting full committee review on 8 December reiterated the previous points made by 
the initial review but also introduced a new requirement: that it was ‘[i]mportant to 
ensure students from Kingston are not included’ (Pickard, 2005). The result of this 
requirement was to restrict severely the recruitment of participants to this research 
(Roberts et al., 2007a) and to redirect the researchers’ focus onto a survey of broader 
student opinions about possible drivers for sex work (Roberts et al., 2007b), an approach 
that while ‘not ideal because it does not directly capture individual involvement’ does 
have the advantage of providing a ‘conduit through the maze of research ethics commit-
tee requirements’ (Roberts et al., 2007a: 145).
The material released under FOI provides no insight into why this new requirement 
– that any sex working students should come from another university – was imposed on 
this project. One obvious explanation is that Kingston University wanted to distance 
itself from the implication that its own students had to resort to this kind of work, and the 
possible resulting bad publicity. This interpretation is strengthened by an email from the 
publicity and press office at Kingston University sent to the student supervisor, referring 
to the subsequent survey of student opinions about possible drivers for student sex work 
(which did access Kingston students):
What worries me is that although I’m sure the research does highlight it [i.e. student sex work] 
as a problem globally as well as nationally, your research is based on a survey undertaken with 
[our] University students and it’s the publicity surrounding that which concerns me. The story 
has hit the international press in India which, as you probably know, is a big market for [the 
University]. (Roberts, 2010: 14)
As the supervisor and the student note in their discussion of their attempt to get the origi-
nal project off the ground:
universities themselves show little enthusiasm to cooperate in addressing the question of why 
their clientele are increasingly turning to employment which entails the provision of sexual 
services to a paying public. The potential psychological and physical cost to students appears 
to be of little interest or else is viewed as a potential source of negative public relations. 
(Roberts et al., 2007a: 145, emphasis added)
In this case, even if this was not the actual intention, the effect of the REC’s final deci-
sion was, without any obvious increase in protection for research subjects, to protect the 
university from the potentially scandalous revelation that its students were engaged in 
sex work.2 Why the REC chose to impose this restriction (which is not raised in any of 
the previous email discussions or sub-committee decisions) remains unclear; for exam-
ple, whether it was suggested by a member of the committee or brought to the committee 
meeting from the University’s management. Whatever the origin of this decision, the 
REC served as an instrument of organisational reputation management, preventing the 
gathering of data that might, when published, harm the University’s interests. Given that 
the research that was completed, which asked about Kingston students’ second hand 
 at Cardiff University on July 31, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
6 Sociology 
understanding of why students turned to sex work, raised concerns on the part of the 
University’s press office, the research that was not carried out may well have harmed the 
University’s reputation. Whether protecting a university’s reputation is a suitable part of 
a REC’s remit is a different question, of course.
URECs, Terrorism and Social Control
This second case explores how, when incidents that harm a university’s reputation have 
already taken place, research ethics review can be employed as a means of internal social 
control and avoidance of future reputational harm. The background to this centres on the 
arrest at Nottingham University, on 14 May 2008, of two men, Rizwaan Sabir and 
Hicham Yezza, under the prevention of terrorism act. Yezza, an administrator at the 
University, was accused of having a copy of a document called The Al-Qaida Training 
Manual, apparently emailed to him by Sabir, a Master’s student and prospective PhD 
candidate. Six days later, both men were released without charge: Sabir had asked Yezza 
to print the document – widely available on the internet from sources such as the US 
Justice department (from where Sabir had downloaded it) and even Amazon – to help 
him with his Masters dissertation (on terrorism) and PhD application (Sabir, 2008).
The focus of this section is not the specifics of the decision to arrest Sabir and Yezza but 
rather the aftermath, both in terms of Sabir’s return to the University (and discussions with 
administrators) and actions related to Dr Rod Thornton. Thornton, a lecturer in the School 
of Politics and International Relations, had protested what he saw as unfair treatment of 
Sabir and Yezza by the University, culminating in a presentation to the British International 
Studies Association (BISA) in April 2011, outlining his case against the University. The 
article itself was taken down from the BISA website under threat of legal action from indi-
viduals named in it, and Thornton himself was suspended from the University because of 
the breakdown in working relationships caused by his paper (Jump, 2011).
The following empirical data come from documents, some gathered through FOI and 
data protection requests, placed on the ‘Unileaks’ website in the wake of Rod Thornton’s 
suspension.3 These include a version of Thornton’s original paper presented at the BISA 
conference as well as: a copy of the formal HR notes made at Thornton’s disciplinary 
hearing in 2009; a transcript of a meeting between Rizwaan Sabir (one of the men 
arrested in the original police operation) and several members of university manage-
ment; and copies of some of the emails and correspondence referred to in these other 
documents. While these documents range across a number of issues, this article focuses 
on two separate issues which highlight both the atypical understanding on the part of 
senior university management of the purpose of URECs as framed by the ESRC’s rules 
and the way in which, in such a context of limited understanding, University RECs’ roles 
can be revised at management request. The first area of interest centres on senior man-
agement’s concern over the lack of UREC review of Rizwaan Sabir’s MA dissertation 
and PhD proposal, and the second, the decision by the Head of School to ask the Politics 
and International Relations REC to review Rod Thornton’s teaching materials.
A couple of months after the original arrests, the issue of whether Sabir should have 
sought UREC approval before accessing The Al-Qaida Training Manual was raised at 
the highest level of the University by the incoming Vice Chancellor, who noted in an 
email:
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Now that we have clarity on the nature of the Al Qaeda manual it would be reasonable to ask 
the question whether access went through the Ethics Committee in the School of Politics and, 
if not, who gave permission for Mr Sabir to access it. (Greenway, 2008)
This query suggests that it is normal UREC practice to review access to this kind of 
document, even though it was available from the US Department of Justice website, and 
at the time was apparently held by the University of Nottingham library. Approving 
access to published literature, even on such sensitive topics, is not normally regarded as 
within the remit of research ethics committees. Historically the focus for RECs has been 
on the ethical issues raised by human subjects research, and this concern remains central 
to current REC practice. Indeed, the ESRC’s guidelines explicitly state that UREC 
review is only required for ‘[r]esearch proposals involving human participants, as well as 
research involving more than minimal risk’ (ESRC, 2010: 10). In this context, ‘risk’ is 
largely defined in terms of the kind of person or group being examined (for example, 
children, or those who lack the capacity for consent). Even where risk is defined in terms 
of the kind of document accessed, this revolves around personal or confidential informa-
tion (ESRC, 2010: 9). A document contained in a university library, or freely available 
over the internet, would not fall into this category. With no human beings involved in 
Sabir’s research, the suggestion that some form of ethics approval was required before 
accessing the Manual implies a lack of familiarity with the traditional role and function 
of URECs or at the very least an idiosyncratic interpretation of the ESRC’s guidelines.
This perspective was held by other members of Nottingham’s senior management. In 
a meeting with the University’s Registrar and Head of Security held following his release, 
Sabir was repeatedly pressed over the lack of ‘direction’ or ‘advice’ he had had from his 
department. When Sabir asked whether he could cite the training manual in his disserta-
tion, the Registrar responded: ‘that’s a question for your supervisors. I guess it’s also a 
question for the research ethics committee in the School of Politics and International 
Studies’ (University of Nottingham, 2008), again implying that the REC’s remit extended 
beyond human subject protection to include oversight of publicly available documents.
The same understanding of the role of RECs apparently existed at the level of the 
School of Politics and International Relations. On 18 September, following Thornton’s 
objections to Sabir and Yezza’s treatment, the Head of the School asked a sub-committee 
of the School’s REC to review Thornton’s teaching materials, in the light of the problems 
caused by Sabir’s accessing of the Al-Qaida Training Manual. The reaction of these REC 
members varied. While two of them ‘sent their responses immediately; the third member 
did not come back with a reply until 26 September’ (University of Nottingham, 2009: 5) 
Indeed this member:
Felt that this was an attack on academic freedom … that there were a number of issues and 
thought this went beyond the remit of the committee. The other two responses saw it enabling 
teaching, and afforded student and staff protection. (University of Nottingham, 2009: 5)
In an email exchange this reluctant member suggested that:
I am not aware of anything in the remit of Ethics Committee that would warrant a procedure 
whereby its members become responsible for the approval of module handouts [reading lists]. 
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So I am not really sure what we are supposed to look for here and by what standards or criteria 
to make a judgement. (cited in Thornton, 2011: 53)
In response, the Head of School explicitly expanded the REC’s remit to include the 
review of non-research related material: ‘Whilst the vast majority of matters that may 
require a view in regard to ethics will be research-related, there are cases (such as the 
present one) where other matters may legitimately fall within the remit of an ethics com-
mittee’ (cited in Thornton, 2011: 53). No apparent reference was made to, for example, 
ESRC guidelines or equivalent documents, so the basis for this expansion is unclear.
The first point to note is that, contra Rod Thornton’s belief that the use of a three 
member sub-committee contravenes the ESRC’s guidelines (Thornton, 2011: 52), the 
use of such a sub-committee is explicitly allowed for by the ESRC Ethics Framework 
(ESRC, 2010). More convincing is Thornton’s suggestion that:
the ESRC … decreed that institutions, in regard to establishing their own research ethics 
committees, should only use them to consider the effects of research on ‘human participants’. 
Needless to say, I did not have any ‘human participants’ on my reading lists. (Thornton, 
2011: 52)
The obvious question becomes why did the Head of School decide to use the REC to 
review teaching materials? When asked about the decision to refer Thornton’s teaching 
materials to the School REC, the Head acknowledged that:
I may have been remiss in not looking for another procedure but I wanted to be in a position to 
protect [the] School against any adverse criticism and the ethics committee existed, was easy 
and convenient and could act in short time. (University of Nottingham, 2009: 5, emphasis 
added)
Whatever the potential source of this ‘criticism’, the Head of School, seems to be clearly 
articulating matters in terms of reputation management. He argues that:
There was a need to reassure others that we were not simply allowing everyone to do as they 
liked – [there was] need for a control mechanism with the School. So [I] felt that if we looked 
at [the] reading list within School through our ethics committee this would be an easy way of 
organising this … It was simply a mechanism so that if we were challenged about reckless 
teaching or exposed to danger awareness, we had a procedure to ensure that this was not the 
case. (University of Nottingham, 2009: 5–6)
Thus the decision to refer Thornton’s teaching material to the REC was one of avoiding 
adverse criticism – the source of which is unclear – in essence, a form of reputation man-
agement, the effect of which was to employ the REC as a form of internal social control, 
an issue raised by Thornton when he asks:
why my reading lists, and mine alone, needed ‘controlling’. Neither one of my courses, and so 
neither one of my reading lists, was in any way linked to the arrests. I was, moreover, not the 
only lecturer … who had courses related to terrorism. So why was I being singled out? 
(Thornton, 2011: 50)
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Whether or not referring Thornton’s teaching materials to the School REC was intended 
as a form of social control, it is clear that in this case an oversight body that was meant 
to be operating according to the ESRC’s guidelines, could – in the view of managers at 
several levels of the university – be ‘re-tasked’ to look at materials historically and intel-
lectually outside of its remit in order to prevent further reputational harm.4
Discussion
From a comparative point of view, the use of URECs as mechanisms of organisational 
reputation management is unsurprising. In the USA, IRBs (Institutional Review Boards) 
– which serve as the explicit template for URECs (Boulton et al., 2004) – have displayed 
similar behaviours for over two decades. The title, Institutional Review Board, under-
lines the organisational context of these bodies; they are located within research institu-
tions, answering both to their host and to the Office of Human Research Protection. This 
is a section of the National Institutes of Health involved in accrediting and overseeing the 
operation of IRBs, which has the power to punish an institution – for example, by freezing 
federal funding – should its IRB fail to act properly, provide adequate oversight of 
research risks or fail to require suitable informed consent materials (for an example of 
such punishment see Marshall, 1999).
As a result, the ‘lens of analysis for the IRB is risk: risk to human subjects and, by 
extension, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, risk to the institution of loss of prestige 
and/or loss of research funding’ (Martin and Inwood, 2012: 9). Within this context of 
institutional protection, some commentators claim that what counts as a ‘risk’ has 
expanded beyond kinds of research that might open a university or hospital up to legal 
sanction or loss of federal research funding. Pragmatically if ‘IRBs are designed to mini-
mize any risk to research institutions’ then ‘one might argue that the complex and bureau-
cratized process of review offers a serendipitous device to frustrate and deter what is 
considered a potential threat to an institution’s reputation or access to revenue sources’ 
(Librett and Perrone, 2010: 738). The normality of this broader, reputational, view of risk 
– and of IRBs’ role in protecting institutions from it – is underlined by the willingness of 
IRBs to discuss their actions in these terms. A good example is John Tierney’s descrip-
tion of challenging an IRB about decisions related to one of his PhD students, trium-
phantly exclaiming to the IRB: ‘“... what you’re saying is that you’re not really worried 
about human subjects per se, but rather about the potential impact on [this university]”’. 
However, Tierney’s ‘elation quickly evaporated when, without the least bit of hesitation 
or shame, they [the IRB] agreed’ (Lincoln and Tierney, 2004: 225). His conclusions that 
‘[s]ome IRBs are quite clear and above board that their main concern is protection of the 
institution from damage’ (Lincoln and Tierney, 2004: 220) is unsurprising, given that a 
longstanding IRB chair can comfortably and openly state that:
[an] important function served by Institutional Review Boards is to protect the institutional 
interest … Private universities are largely corporations. The respect for academic freedom 
within these corporations is desirable, but not indispensable … Institutional Review Boards can 
forestall the public image problems and protect the institution’s reputation by weeding out 
politically sensitive studies before they are approved. (Moss, 2007: 803–804, emphases added)
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The position outlined here by Jonathon Moss of the University of Chicago is clearly 
about more than just protecting institutions’ access to federal funding, but rather broader 
concerns about research that may embarrass or otherwise damage the image of universi-
ties or other research bodies.
The exact nature of this risky, ‘politically sensitive’ research is unclear, but it may 
involve children, research into people’s sexual preferences and experience (Adler and 
Adler, 2002) or both (Johnson, 2008), or work that is potentially critical of specific insti-
tutions or professions (Librett and Perrone, 2010; Timmermans, 1995). As early as 1983, 
Murray Levine (1983: 8) warned that IRB review could be used by institutions to under-
mine ‘research with political implications … [providing] … bureaucratic tactics to force 
lengthy delays … in the hopes that the proponent of the issue will become discouraged, 
“cool down” and [have] given up pursuing it’.
The evidence presented in this article suggests that URECs in the UK are quite capa-
ble of mirroring the behaviour of their US counterparts, of serving as, in Librett and 
Perrone’s (2010) elegant turn of phrase, ‘serendipitous device[s] to frustrate and deter 
potential threats to an institution’s reputation’. However, the drivers for this in the USA 
are distinct from those in the UK. Unlike US IRBs with concerns about research funding 
and legal threats, URECs’ role as a mechanism for reputation management stems from 
the application of NPM to higher education. The end result, though, is much the same: a 
context where the main goal of risk management becomes protecting the university’s 
reputation, and where it is perhaps unsurprising that research ethics committees become 
co-opted by university management to prevent research which might embarrass the insti-
tution, to control reading lists which might contain books that may make the university 
look bad. British-based academics carry out research into children, sex, drugs, criminal 
behaviours and a whole host of other potentially ‘embarrassing’ topics. If it is the case 
that ethics review bodies can come to serve the reputational interests of their host institu-
tions (as the US comparison suggests), then it is unsurprising that university research 
ethics committees have made decisions about such research that are centred on the pro-
tection of institutional interests rather than the protection of research participants.
Of course, one does not need URECs to discipline behaviour that threatens universi-
ties’ reputations; in 1934 Harold Laski, Professor of Political Science at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) and ardent socialist was censured for columns in the Dailey 
Herald that infringed a rule requiring LSE teachers ‘to pay proper regard to the reputation 
of the School when expressing their views’ (Barendt, 2010: 84). And numerous examples 
exist where academics’ freedom to express their (extramural) political views or (intramu-
ral) opinions about the running of universities have run up against management concerns 
about external reputation. The point is that URECs present a new, and largely unacknowl-
edged, stealthy, mechanism through which management can restrict, not just what aca-
demics say to the press or on their blogs, but what research they do in the first place.
URECs, by their very nature, can restrict research and can thus infringe academic 
freedom. The point is that the grounds upon which a UREC restricts research are explicit 
and limited to the protection of those people enrolled in research. Even critics of the 
application of prior ethics review to social science acknowledge that ‘academic freedom 
and the protection of individuals from undue harm are two core principles of the acad-
emy, and they are not in conflict with one another’ (Tierney and Corwin, 2007: 392). The 
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question is whether ‘protecting a university from reputational harm’ is a core principle of 
the academy. If it is not, then restricting academic freedom on these grounds through 
UREC review of research is illegitimate. While professional codes of conduct for social 
scientists – for example, those of the British Sociological Association or the Association 
of Social Anthropologists – do mention obligations towards employers and research 
sponsors, these are couched in terms of being honest about one’s qualifications or the 
limits of particular methods. When these guidelines discuss harm, it is with regard to 
research participants, rather than employers’ reputations, that researchers are told to 
direct their attention.
In considering the implications of this article, one approach might be to point out the 
limited nature of only two case studies; perhaps these are the only two instances where 
universities have used URECs to attempt to manage reputational harm. Perhaps these are 
outlier examples at institutions where, normally, URECs operate properly, where aca-
demic freedom is not overridden in the interests of reputation management. Without 
other examples, it is hard to say if this is the case or not. However, given that the source 
of URECs’ role in reputation management lies in widely acknowledged sector wide 
developments – the rise of NPM in higher education – as well as specific changes noted 
beyond the sector – the mutation of risk management into reputation management – and 
the extensive comparative evidence available from the USA, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that these examples represent a larger number of cases, at a range of different 
universities, where URECs have been used to restrict academic freedom in order to pro-
tect institutional reputation.
URECs’ role as mechanisms of reputation management is a direct result of their 
embedded nature; as bodies set within universities the risk is that they come to protect 
the interests of those organisations that host them. While the ESRC’s guidelines stress 
the need for URECs to be ‘free from bias and undue influence from the institution in 
which they are located’ (ESRC, 2010: 10), the only suggestion to insulate URECs from 
institutional influence is that ‘RECs include members who are independent of the institu-
tion’ (ESRC, 2010: 10). Unfortunately this is the same solution operated in the US IRB 
system – all IRBs are required to have a non-institutional member – and it is clear that 
this has not prevented the ‘institutional capture’ of US IRBs. The ESRC’s belief that the 
‘independence of RECs is founded on their membership, on strict rules regarding con-
flict of interests and on regular monitoring of and accountability for their decisions’ 
(ESRC, 2010: 10) ignores the way in which their accountability tends to be to the man-
agement of their host institution, limiting this independence. The cost and speed advan-
tages of devolving prior ethics review down to the level of the university (Tinker and 
Coomber, 2004) must be set against the way the organisational embedding of URECs 
provides an opportunity for potentially illegitimate concerns to shape UREC decisions; 
institutional ethics review bodies, such as IRBs or URECs serve as opportunity struc-
tures for management restrictions on academic freedom.
The findings of this article have clear implications for sociologists, their students and 
for social science research more generally. Given that the context that has driven these 
developments in ethics review – the rise of NPM in UK higher education – seems well 
established and part of the mainstream, it is unlikely that universities will, of their own 
free will, suppress the reputation management role of URECs. As a result, we should 
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expect more cases of these kinds of restrictions of academic freedom, of academics and 
their students being denied permission to carry out research, not because of risk to par-
ticipants but because of potential reputational harm to their universities.
Despite this, there are obvious solutions. While critics may claim that these problems 
require the rejection of the prior ethical review of social science research by URECs 
altogether, other options present themselves. The first approach is to develop a clear 
distinction between URECs (at whatever level they operate, whether it be centrally or at 
the faculty level) and university management, most obviously by restricting membership 
of such committees to non-managerial staff. What ‘non-managerial’ means is open to 
debate, but at the simplest level this would exclude deans, heads of school, pro-vice 
chancellors and registrars (to name but a few) from UREC membership. Such clear sepa-
ration is common in debates around the role of self-regulatory units within larger organi-
sations (Black, 2001) and avoids the more extreme solution of removing ethics review 
from individual universities with the use of central or regional, rather than institutional, 
committees. The second, complementary, approach requires greater transparency around 
UREC decisions, with minutes of meetings and decisions automatically becoming publi-
cally available, and the opening up of committee meetings to observation by members of 
staff. While this will not necessarily prevent URECs from serving the interests of man-
agement in reputation protection, it makes such activity harder to hide and forces such 
decisions to be articulated in a more open setting. For either of these approaches to 
become standard within UREC practice requires the ESRC to be willing to return to its 
ethics framework and introduce further revisions. One objection might be that the ESRC 
has ‘done enough damage’ by mandating ethics review in the first place, yet the real 
problem lies in the ESRC’s willingness to introduce a form of institutionalised ethics 
review that even limited engagement with the literature – and the US experience – would 
have suggested was problematic and a threat to academic freedom. There is thus, per-
haps, an onus on them to remedy the faults in the system they introduced.
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Notes
1. Because FOI releases tend to anonymise names, for consistency and privacy this article con-
tinues to anonymise individual academics and staff except where this is impossible (e.g. they 
are named in the title of documents).
2. One alternative might be that these issues were raised simply because the research was 
to be carried out by an undergraduate, and that if an experienced academic had proposed 
the research, these concerns would not have occurred. While impossible to say for sure, 
the broader problems faced by UK researchers into student sex work generally (regardless 
of experience) suggests that the student status of the researcher was not the cause of this 
restriction.
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3. At 10 March 2015, this material is linked to via: http://www.scribd.com/doc/57593198/How-
a-Students-Use-of-a-Library-Book-Became-a-Major-Islamist-Plot-UNILEAKS-VERSION. 
It is also available from the author on request.
4. In the summer of 2009, the University of Nottingham set up a ‘module review committee’ 
to vet all teaching material for references that might be illegal or might incite violence. This 
in itself raises questions about academic freedom but sits outside of the focus of this article 
(Newman, 2009).
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